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I. INTRODUCTION
"Sexual minorities - lesbians, gay males, bisexuals, and
transgender people - are among the most despised groups
in the United States today. Perhaps paradoxically, for
many in our society, love of sameness (i.e. homo-sexuality)
makes people different, whereas love of difference (i.e.
hetero-sexuality) makes people the same."1
Rights concerning sexual orientation have come to the fore-
front in the last twenty years. The legalization of same-sex mar-
riage was a big part of this battle, and in the year 2000, the
Netherlands became the first country to recognize it.2 As of 2010,
* Juris Doctor candidate, May 2011, University of Miami School of Law. B.A. in
Psychology, New York University. I would like to thank my advisor, Professor
Michael H. Graham and Professor Francisco Valdes for his assistance in forming my
topic. I would also like to thank my family, specifically my parents, without whom,
this paper would not have been possible.
1. HOMOPHOBIA: How WE ALL PAY THE PRICE 3 (Warren J. Blumenfeld ed.,
Beacon Press 1992).
2. World's First Legal Gay Weddings, ONE NEWS, Apr. 1, 2001, http://tvnz.co.nz/
view/news-world-story-skin/34978.
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Canada,3 Uruguay,4 Argentina,5 Spain, Belgium, South Africa, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway have all legalized same-sex
marriage.' Also, Mexico City has become the only city to recognize
gay marriage in Mexico.' Portugal is the latest European country
to approve of gay marriage.' The prime minister, Jose Socrates,
stated that the approval of gay marriage was a step in favor of the
country's fight against anti-discrimination.9
Even though countries around the world have taken this
important step, the United States still resists recognition based on
the Defense of Marriage Act ° ("DOMA") enacted in 1996, which
allows the states to deny recognition to marriages performed in a
foreign jurisdiction that are against state public policy. DOMA
states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, terri-
tory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under
the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe,
or a right or claim arising from such relationship."
Even though the Act only encompasses states within the U.S.,
many states, in adopting their own version of DOMA, or their
"mini-DOMA," have included jurisdictions outside the United
States. DOLA seems, on its face, to be contrary to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause in the U.S. Constitution, 12 but thus far, no court
has come to this conclusion. The Middle District of Florida held
3. Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33 (Can.).
4. E. Eduardo Castillo, Mexico City Assembly Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage,
YAHoo! NEWS, available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20091221/aponre-la_amca/
It mexico-gay-marriage.
5. Michael Warren, Argentina Legalizes Gay Marriage in Historic Vote, YAHoo!
NEWS, available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100715/ap-on-re-la am-ca/it_
argentina-gaymarriage.
6. Sweden Allows Same-Sex Marriage, BBC NEws, Apr. 2, 2009, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/7978495.stm.
7. Castillo, supra note 4.
8. Shrikesh Laxmidas, Portugal Approves Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/0108/world/international-uk-portugal-
marriage.html.
9. Id.
10. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West 1996).
11. Id.
12. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the
Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and
proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.").
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2010] COMITY: ANOTHER NAIL IN THE COFFIN 147
that the Act embodied Congress' role in administering full faith
and credit because the Act regulates conflicts between the states. 3
The Middle District also found that the statute was constitutional
because there is no fundamental right to have a same-sex
marriage."
This opinion, however, only addresses the issue of the conflict
as it has come up between the states. A similar result is expected
if the marriage was performed in another country, but reliance on
the Full Faith and Credit Clause would not be a defense. This is
where other principals of recognition are important, such as the
principal of comity.
Comity has had little effect when used as a defense for the
recognition of a foreign performed same-sex marriage. Comity has
been regarded with even less merit than the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Comity first appeared in the U.S. in the case of Hilton v.
Guyot," but the theories behind this policy have been in force
since the beginning of the seventeenth century. 6 The definition of
comity in U.S. law comes from Hilton:
'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good
will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, execu-
tive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws.' 7
Even though this definition leaves us with the sense that there is
room for judicial discretion, this discretion is limited to when the
laws of another country are repugnant to U.S. public policy. 8
Comity today, over 100 years after the Hilton decision, still
13. Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that
DOMA does not violate the constitution or full faith and credit). This case does not
address the issue of marriages performed abroad and their recognition in the U.S.
Rather, it is pertinent to show the stand that the U.S. has taken by allowing states to
base the recognition of same-sex marriages by their own public policy and not having
the policy of another state forced upon them. If anything, this is a more dramatic
example because states are more likely to recognize the laws of another state before
recognizing the laws of another country.
14. Id. at 1306.
15. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 143-45 (1895).
16. See generally ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE COMITY OF ERRORS: A
CASE STUDY IN CONFLICT OF LAws 2 (University of Georgia Press 1992).
17. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 143-45.
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 482 (1987).
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retains the same definition as given in Hilton, yet its effect pro-
duces strange results. A foreign performed same-sex marriage
could be accepted in New York due to comity and that same mar-
riage would be rejected in Florida based on comity, demonstrating
how arbitrary the principle has become. If the original tenets of
comity were followed, this would not be the case. Judgments
would be predictable and consistent over time if the original policy
of comity were followed. If comity were formulaic instead of discre-
tionary (as the doctrine is now used), foreign marriages would
automatically be recognized as long as they were legally per-
formed in the country where the couple had previously been domi-
ciled before entering the United States.
This strange result from the application of comity may be
attributed to institutional homophobia. Institutional homophobia
refers to the ways in which "governments, businesses, and educa-
tional, religious and professional organizations systematically dis-
criminate on the basis of sexual orientation or identity."19 This
form of homophobia is enforced through laws and codes that treat
homosexuals as second-class citizens.2 ° Scholars believe that the
recognition of same-sex marriage in the U.S. will be the end of
discrimination against homosexuals and will put an end to insti-
tutional homophobia.21 The way in which comity has been used, as
a sword against the recognition of legally performed foreign same-
sex marriages, is another example of how institutional
homophobia has taken root in the government institutions and
allowed for outright discrimination against homosexuals.
This note will explore the history of same-sex marriage and
comity, and how they have interacted to perpetuate institutional
homophobia, as well as the expansion of that relationship in the
future. Part II of this note will present the history of marriage law
and why U.S. public policy dictates that same-sex marriage will
not be recognized through comity. Part III will explore the history
of comity and its evolution. It will further address the works on
comity by Justice Joseph Story, the original U.S. writer on the
subject. Part IV will address the way in which institutional
homophobia has taken root in our society and its use of comity to
continue to foster discrimination against those of a different sex-
19. See Blumenfeld, supra note 1, at 5.
20. Id.
21. AMY D. RONNER, HOMOPHOBIA AND THE LAw 29 (American Psychological
Association 2005).
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ual orientation. Finally, Part V will further explore the effect that
comity should have had under its actual definition.
II. MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: THE SHIFT OF Focus
FROM INCEST TO HOMOSEXUALITY
Historically, issues over recognition of foreign marriages
arose when another country's incest laws differed from state laws
in the U.S.22 For example, if an uncle legally married his niece in
Italy and then the couple immigrated to New Jersey, they would
be arrested pursuant to New Jersey's incest laws for cohabitation.
In this situation, the principles of international recognition would
be of use." While, under New Jersey state law, this marriage
would be invalid if the uncle was a legal New Jersey resident,
because the uncle is an Italian citizen, comity obligates the New
Jersey courts to legally recognize this marriage." Due to the fact
that incest laws varied from state to state and country to country,
this problem commonly arose when couples of close familial rela-
tionship chose to immigrate and establish a new domicile in the
U.S.
The above scenario demonstrates many of the common law
principles that apply to migrating marriages of questionable
validity in the U.S. First, the "general rule is that the validity of a
marriage is determined by the law of the place where it was con-
tracted."25 This is a well known rule and has hardly any
exceptions:
The rule that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid
everywhere is, with few exceptions, so well recognized by
the courts, for reasons of general policy, that it has almost
become a maxim in the field of conflict of laws. Exceptions
to the general rule are 1.) polygamous marriages and mar-
riages incestuous according to the principles prevailing in
Christendom, and sometimes 2.) marriages prohibited by
the public acts of the forum for reasons of local distinctive
policy.26
Today, Christendom is not cited to, instead it's substituted with
22. See generally P.H. Vartanian, Annotation, Recognition of Foreign Marriage as
Affected by Policy in Respect of Incestuous Marriages, 117 A.L.R. 186 (1938).
23. Bucca v. State, 128 A.2d 506 (N.J. 1957).
24. Id. at 509-10.
25. Id. at 508.
26. P.H. Vartanian, Annotation, Recognition of Foreign Marriage as Affected by
Policy in Respect of Incestuous Marriages, 117 A.L.R. 186 (1938).
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"natural law,"27 but the principle is still the same. These general
common law policies demonstrate the rules of law in marriage
that were consistently followed until the types of marriage that
were subject to litigation shifted from incestuous marriages to
same-sex marriages.
A. The U.S. Takes Its Stand Against Same-Sex
Marriage
In 1996, the U.S. adopted into law two acts that would effec-
tively halt the same-sex marriage movement in its tracks. After
the Supreme Court of Hawaii in 1993 held that the Hawaiian
marriage statute on its face violated its constitution's equal pro-
tection clause,28 the federal government was worried that this
state was dangerously close to granting same-sex marriages, and
the implications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause would man-
date recognition of marriages performed in Hawaii in every state
around the country.29
Thus, Congress enacted DOMA,3° which defines marriage for
the purposes of federal law." Under federal law, marriage means
"only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife."32 There were two purposes behind the passage of the
Act: 1.) "to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual mar-
riage; ""3 and 2.) to allow the states to formulate their own public
policy regarding same-sex marriages. 4 With the Hawaii Supreme
Court decision, the federal government wanted to ensure that
states were able to decide whether to recognize same-sex mar-
riages based on their own policy and not force the recognition
based on federal principles such as the Full Faith and Credit
27. See id.
28. Beahr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993). This case was remanded to the
circuit court in order for Lewin to bring evidence to overcome the strict scrutiny
standard and show the state's compelling interest for limiting marriage to
heterosexual couples.
29. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2, 4 (1996) reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905.
This House Report details the legislative history of DOMA and points to Beahr v.
Lewin as the main reason for its enactment. It also provides the governmental
interests supporting DOMA and the findings of the various committees concerning
the Act. Ironically, after Beahr, a constitutional amendment was passed that banned
same-sex marriage in Hawaii. HAw. CONST. art. I, § 23.
30. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West 1996).
31. 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1996).
32. Id.
33. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2.
34. See generally id.
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Clause." These acts became effective September 21, 1996.36
When President Bill Clinton signed this Act into law he
emphasized what DOMA was meant to accomplish and reiterated
that this Act gives the states an opportunity to choose for them-
selves how to treat same-sex marriages.37 He further emphasized
that this Act did not go beyond its stated purpose, even though it
is surrounded by divisive rhetoric." President Clinton's comment
effectively recognizes the presence of institutional homophobia in
the American legal system. Four years later, President George W.
Bush also supported DOMA, shown by his unsolicited statement,
"I believe marriage is a union between a man and a woman. I
believe it's a sacred institution that is critical to the health of our
society and the well-being of families, and it must be defended."39
The viewpoints against same-sex marriage and the support of
this statute further demonstrate how organizations and the gov-
ernment use the law to assert their own personal homophobia.
DOMA and the reasons behind its inception depict the unrealistic
fears of society against homosexuals. These fears have permeated
the framework of American history so that the definitions of mar-
riage have been restructured for the purpose of excluding homo-
sexuals from this institution. Hence, the emphasis in President
Bush's statement that marriage is between one man and one
woman, instead of the more generic definition, which emphasizes
the union of two people in order to become a family.
The states have each reacted differently to the introduction of
DOMA. Thirty-nine states prohibit homosexual couples from mar-
rying with laws modeled after DOMA.40 However, two of the states
with legislative bans, Oregon and Nevada, recognize domestic
partnerships or civil unions.4' New Mexico has no marriage laws
in their state but has yet to recognize or deny recognition of same-
35. Id.
36. Kavan Peterson, 50-State Rundown on Gay Marriage Laws, STATELINE.ORG
(Nov. 23, 2004), http://www.stateline.org/live/printable/story?contentId=15576.
37. See Press Release, President Bill Clinton, President on Signing Same Gender
Marriage Ban (Sept. 22, 1996), 1996 WL 533626.
38. Id.
39. Bush Defines Marriage as Man and Woman, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2006, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/26/AR2006102600876-pf.
html.
40. Kavan Peterson, State by State: The Legal Battle Over Gay Marriage, NPR.oRG
(Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=112448663
This article does not reflect the changes made in California in August of 2010. See
generally Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
41. Peterson, supra note 40.
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sex marriage.42 Also, New Jersey does not recognize same-sex
marriage, but has no laws enacted that are modeled after
DOMA.43 New Jersey does recognize civil unions." New York
allows for recognition of marriages performed elsewhere, but does
not yet perform same-sex marriages within the state.4" Most of
New England, Iowa, and California recognize same-sex mar-
riages.46 The most recent state to recognize same-sex marriage is
California, where, in August of 2010, a federal court struck down
California's constitutional amendment banning gay marriage as
unconstitutional. 47 The parties to that case are not planning on
appealing the ruling; therefore, gay marriages will once again be
performed in California. 8
States that have adopted the prohibition do so by either codi-
fying DOMA into state law or by writing a ban into their constitu-
tion.49 For example, Florida's mini-DOMA reads as follows:
1.) Marriages between persons of the same sex entered into
in any jurisdiction, whether within or outside the State of
Florida, the United States, or any other jurisdiction, either
domestic or foreign, or any other place or location, or rela-
tionships between persons of the same sex which are
treated as marriages in any jurisdiction, whether within or
outside the State of Florida, the United States, or any other
jurisdiction, either domestic or foreign, or any other place
or location, are not recognized for any purpose in this state.
2.) The state, its agencies, and its political subdivisions
may not give effect to any public act, record, or judicial pro-
ceeding of any state, territory, possession, or tribe of the
United States or of any other jurisdiction, either domestic
or foreign, or any other place or location respecting either a
marriage or relationship not recognized under subsection
(1) or a claim arising from such a marriage or relationship.
42. Id.
43. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28 (West 2010).
44. Peterson, supra note 40.
45. Martinez v. Monroe, 50 A.D.3d 189, 193 (N.Y. 2008).
46. Peterson, supra note 40.
47. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
48. Daniel C. Vock, State Officials Step Aside for Prop. 8's Demise, STATELINE.ORG
(Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=505823. The
ruling will not be appealed because the parties do not have standing based on Judge
Walker's belief that "a party must show that it has suffered an actual injury." Judge
Walker said no evidence suggests that the campaign (supporting Proposition 8) would
meet that test.
49. Peterson, supra note 40.
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3.) For purposes of interpreting any state statute or rule,
the term "marriage" means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the term
"spouse" applies only to a member of such a union.0
These mini-DOlAs, or the state law versions of DOMA, have
been enacted in order to provide a mechanism for stating that
same-sex marriage is against that state's policy.
B. The Defense of Marriage Act and Its Impact
While DOMA law has been accepted and codified in a major-
ity of states in the U.S., there are a few states that have ignored it
completely. These states have allowed the legal recognition of
same-sex marriage, but will not actually perform these kinds of
marriages within the state. New York is one of these states as
shown in the case of Martinez v. Monroe, where the court pointed
out that as long as the New York legislature does not codify
DOMA, the courts will extend full faith and credit and comity to
marriages legally performed in other jurisdictions.5' The court
decided that it would recognize same-sex marriages based on the
same common law scheme that permitted recognition of legally
performed incestuous marriages.
In states that have enacted their own mini-DOMA, courts
almost always uphold its validity. However, many same-sex
couples who have challenged DOMA were never able to question
its constitutionality because they "lacked standing" to bring the
claim.52 These standing issues seemed to be a way for courts to
avoid hearing the issues of the case.
One such lesbian couple, who had been married legally in
Canada, sought to have their marriage recognized in Oklahoma.
They challenged the amendment to the Oklahoma constitution
that stated that Oklahoma will not recognize same-sex marriages
performed in other states and that any person who issues a mar-
riage license for a same-sex couple will be guilty of a misde-
50. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West 2010).
51. Martinez v. Monroe, 50 A.D.3d 189, 193 (N.Y. 2008). In this case, a Canadian
couple petitioned the court for the recognition of spousal benefits. The court said that
they should not be denied recognition because their marriage was legally performed
in Canada.
52. Mueller v. Comm'r, 39 F. App'x 437 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that because the
couple was not legally married in another state they lacked standing to challenge
DOMA); Bishop v. Oklahoma, 333 F. App'x 361, 365 (10th Cir. 2009) (concluding that
the couple lacked standing to challenge because they did not bring the proper
defendant as a party).
153
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1
meanor. 53 The court held that the couple did not have standing to
bring a suit challenging the constitution because they did not have
the proper party named as a defendant in the case. 4 The Attorney
General, the named defendant, was not the party who would
enforce the law and injure the couple; therefore, the suit was dis-
missed. In this case, the court asserted that there was no proper
party to sue because no party was responsible for the enforcement
of the law and any injury would be against the person who issued
the license, not the couple seeking to marry.5" This case demon-
strates the weird, but consistent results, which are apparent in
cases regarding same-sex marriage.
In the states that have adopted DOMA, its constitutionality
has been consistently affirmed. 57 DOMA's definition of marriage
as defined in section three 51 of the Act was challenged in In re
Kandu when a same-sex couple (who had been married in
Canada) filed a joint-petition for bankruptcy in Washington.59 The
court found that there was no fundamental right to marry some-
one of the same gender,6" homosexuals do not constitute a suspect
or a quasi-suspect class, and there was no discrimination against
either men or women under this law. 1 It also held that DOMA did
not violate due process or equal protection based on a rational
basis review because the Act furthers a legitimate governmental
interest of protecting the institution of "traditional, heterosexual
marriage."62 This case demonstrates the traditional analysis that
courts have undertaken to defend DOMA, and that the public pol-
icy exceptions that stem from the protection of traditional mar-
riages are based on the circular logic that history should be
followed."
DOMA has defeated Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Amendment
arguments as well.' For example, the debtor in In re Kandu peti-
53. Bishop, 333 F. App'x at 363.
54. Id. at 365.
55. Id.
56. Id..
57. See Castillo, supra note 4.
58. 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1996).
59. In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (W.D. Wash. 2004). Kandu discusses at length the
public policy reasons invoked when defending DOMA, infra Part II(C). Also, this case
specifically discusses how comity has been ineffective in the fight to have foreign
marriages recognized in the U.S., discussed infra Part IV.
60. Id. at 140.
61. Id. at 143.
62. Id. at 145-46.
63. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905.
64. Kandu, 315 B.R. at 123.
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tioned the court to have his same-sex marriage recognized in a
bankruptcy proceeding.65 The debtor argued that DOMA is uncon-
stitutional because it violated the Fourth Amendment because his
federal rights and responsibilities were taken from him under the
search and seizure provisions. 6  The court held that the couple's
Fourth Amendment rights could not be violated because they
failed to demonstrate possessory interest in government benefits
that were entitled to protection.67 In other words, because the
debtor's marriage did not fit the definition of marriage under fed-
eral law, the couple was not entitled to the benefits in bankruptcy
that married couples would typically have. 6' The court denied the
argument because there was no legal basis to support the claim.69
Additionally, the debtor argued that DOMA violated the due
process and equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.
The Court dismissed this argument because there was authority
in Baker v. Nelson that stated that same-sex marriage is not a
fundamental right and there was no due process violation. Since
DOMA only had to pass rational basis review, the court found that
the legislation is rationally related to a legitimate government
interest in that the government had an interest in preserving the
traditional bonds of marriage.7'
The debtor also argued that there was a Tenth Amendment
violation because the federal government was trying to regulate
domestic relations, a power not granted to Congress in Article I of
the U.S. Constitution." The court stated that the definition of
marriage is not binding on the states, but rather the states retain
the power to decide their own definition of marriage.73 Therefore
DOMA does not infringe on state sovereignty at all because it only
applies to federal law."
Furthermore, DOMA circumvented the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Where the Full Faith and Credit Clause would normally
demand the recognition of other states' marriages, DOMA has
allowed for each state to choose its own recognition policy. The
65. Id. at 134.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 135.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 140, 143.
71. Id. at 146.
72. Id. at 131.
73. Id. at 132.
74. Id.
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argument against the application of full faith and credit is that
the Act embodies Congress' role of regulating conflict between the
states.75
C. The Public Policy Exception: What DOMA is
Protecting
There are three types of cases that bring the validity of same-
sex marriages performed in another state to the forefront in litiga-
tion: dissolution of the relationship, legal incidents, and preceden-
tial recognition. 6 The legal incidents are usually about spousal
recognition for benefits for government programs77 and bank-
ruptcy petitions." These petitions for recognition have been sum-
marily denied in all states where it is against that state's "public
policy."
A state's public policy is also alluded to as a reason to deny
recognition to same-sex marriages under DOMA 9 Courts invoke
DOMA to deny same-sex marriage as against public policy and the
court knows this because of the enactment of DOMA.80 The pur-
pose of DOMA is to protect traditional, heterosexual marriages."'
This is one of the four U.S. governmental interests that were put
forward in the legislative history. Furthermore, the government is
1.) "defending the traditional notions of morality;" 2.) "protecting
state sovereignty and democratic self-governance;" and 3.) "pre-
serving scarce government resources. "  These governmental
interests seem to be rational according to the courts, and since
they do not have to be persuasive pursuant to a rational basis
review, they satisfy the minimum burden imposed for DOMA to
remain constitutional.83
According to the legislative history of DOMA, the notion of
protecting traditional, heterosexual marriage is really Congress'
subterfuge for furthering procreation, and it is the inescapable
75. Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
76. Brenda Cossman, Betwixt and Between Recognition: Migrating Same-Sex
Marriages and the Turn Toward the Private, 71 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 158
(2008).
77. Martinez v. Monroe, 50 A.D.3d 189 (N.Y. 2008).
78. In re Goodale, 298 B.R. 886 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
79. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West 1996).
80. Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1303-04.
81. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2916.
82. Id.
83. See In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
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fact that only two people, a man and a woman, can create a child. 4
Additionally, Congress wanted to protect traditional marriages
because the addition of same-sex couples would lead to more
divorces.85 As stated in the legislative history, they wanted to
avoid "opening a new front in the war."" Courts also have stated
reasons to avoid same-sex marriage because there is a fear that it
would be a gateway for the recognition of polygamous and incestu-
ous marriages. The reasoning behind DOMA is filled with heter-
ocentrics7 language, so even though there is no explicit
discrimination evidenced in the language used, the law still allo-
cates same-sex couples to an inferior status.
D. Canada's Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage and
the Bigger Chances for Migrating Marriages
Canada has recognized same-sex marriages since 2005 when
it passed the Civil Marriage Act, which defined marriage as "the
lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others."8 This
bill specifically states that this is an expansion of the traditional
common-law definition of marriage for the purpose of including
couples of the same-sex.89 Canada decided to legalize same-sex
marriage after several cases found that the definition of marriage
is not fixed, but something that is changing over time, and that
procreation is no longer an overriding reason to limit marriage to
those who can procreate unassisted.9" Furthermore, several courts
also found that limiting marriage to heterosexual couples was
against the equality guarantee of their Charter.91
84. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 13 (1996).
85. Id. at 14.
86. Id. at 15.
87. Refers to language that centers on a heterosexual point of view. Robert B.
Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient
Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 149 (1992).
88. Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33 (Can.).
89. Id.
90. EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada, [2003] 13 B.C.L.R. 4th 1 (Can.).
91. Same-Sex Marriage (Re), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (Can.). The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms section 15(1) states that "every individual is equal before and
under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law
without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental and physical disability."
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.). This clause varies dramatically from
the U.S. Constitution because the Canadian Charter delineates certain classes upon
which discrimination will not be based. While these classes are all recognized in U.S.
common law, courts have yet to find that laws against same-sex marriage are against
equal protection like the Canadian courts have.
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Canadian courts based their decisions on same-sex marriage
on the incremental changes that have taken place in their com-
mon law thus far. These decisions sought to bridge the gap
between the rights and privileges given to heterosexual couples
and those denied to same-sex couples.2 Those changes include
spousal support, guardianship, adoption, pension entitlement and
medical decision-making. Generally, defining spouse differently in
the statutes in order to include same-sex partners accomplished
these changes.93
The recognition of same-sex marriage in Canada could have a
huge impact on the U.S. concerning migrating marriages. Suits
have already been brought where a couple, originally from
Canada, sought recognition of their marriage in the U.S. to main-
tain benefits that were accorded to them as a married couple.94
One could even imagine a scenario where a Canadian couple visit-
ing the U.S. could suffer a medical injury and their marriage
would be denied recognition at the local hospital so no medical
decisions could be made on behalf of their spouse.95 There are an
enormous number of possibilities concerning migrating marriages
and this further supports the need for recognition of marriages
that are legally performed in another locale.
III. HISTORY OF COMITY - HILTON AND JUSTICE STORY
The divergence between the United States and Canada on the
issue of same-sex marriages poses a problem that only the conflict
of laws theory can sort out. Historically, the principal of comity
was used to remedy problems where recognition of another coun-
try's laws was needed in order to determine the status of a person
92. EGALE, [2003] 13 B.C.L.R. 4th 1, para. 37 (Can.).
93. Id.
94. Martinez v. Monroe, 50 A.D.3d 189 (N.Y. 2008); Bishop v. Oklahoma, 333 F.
App'x 361 (10th Cir. 2009); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
95. A similar situation took place in Florida where a lesbian couple from
Washington State was going to take a cruise leaving out of the port of Miami when
one of the women suffered a brain aneurysm. The hospital, pursuant to policy, would
not allow the patient to see her partner and they were kept apart while she died. The
district court dismissed the discrimination suit and held that the hospital was
following policy and not "anti-gay." The couple was not married, and in the state of
Florida, where DOMA has been repeatedly upheld, it is difficult to see if there would
have been a different outcome had the couple been legally married in another state.
Steve Rothaus, Jackson Memorial Hospital Nurses Personally Apologize to Lesbian
Whose Partner Died There, MLAmi HERALD, Nov. 20, 2009, http://miamiherald.type
pad.com/gaysouthflorida/2009/11/gay-nurses-at-jackson-memorial-hospital-personall
y-apologize-to-lesbian-whose-partner-died-there.html.
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currently within the U.S.96 Marriage was often recognized as a
status that comity regulated when a marriage migrated between
nations.97 Comity, in U.S. law, originated from the case of Hilton v.
Guyot,9" and this opinion is still cited to today in any decision
where comity needs to be defined.99
The Hilton decision was based on Justice Story's theory of
comity.' 0 The general tenets state that 1.) no law has any effect on
its own outside of the territory in which it is promulgated; 10 2.)
comity is neither an absolute obligation nor a mere courtesy;02 3.)
"no nation will suffer the laws of another to interfere with her own
to the injury of her citizens;"103 4.) foreign judgments are entitled
to effect when a court having jurisdiction over the matter renders
them as a regular proceeding with proper notice;0 4 and 5.) the
judgment affecting the status of persons is recognized as valid in
every country, unless repugnant to the policy of its own laws. 105
These principles along with the definition of comity..6 are the pri-
mary parts of Hilton that are relied on time and again when deter-
mining the effect of a foreign law or judgment. Justice Story in his
work also called comity a "paramount moral duty" and described it
as an "imperfect obligation."'07
Justice Story's theory of comity lacks uniformity and leaves
much to judicial discretion. 08 This is contrary to the theory of com-
ity promulgated by Ulrich Huber upon which Justice Story's the-
ory is based. 09 Huber's theory proposed the assumption of three
axioms, which produce a predictable result when applied to a con-
flict of laws situation:
96. See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
97. WATSON, supra note 16, at 9.
98. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 113.
99. In re Kandu, 315 B.R. at 133-34.
100. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 143.
101. Id. at 143.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 144.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 145. After the tenant of comity is given in Hilton, the example of status
is "such as a decree confirming or dissolving a marriage."
106. See supra Part I.
107. WATSON, supra note 16, at 20.
108. Id. at 22.
109. See WATSON, supra note 16 for a detailed analysis of the difference between
Huber and Justice Story's theory. The author's thesis rests on the theory that Story
made a mistake in his analysis of Huber, and misinterpreted one of the axioms,
because under Huber's theory, comity should predict the outcome of any case,
whereas Justice Story's theory leaves matters undeterminable.
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1.) The laws of each sovereign authority have force within
the boundaries of its state, and bind all subject to it, but not
beyond; 2.) "those people are held to be subject to a sover-
eign authority who are found within its boundaries,
whether they are there permanently or temporarily; and 3.)
the rulers of states so act from comity that the rights of
each people exercised within its own boundaries should
retain their force everywhere, insofar as they do not
prejudice the power or rights of another state or its
citizens.110
These axioms are similar to those tenets laid out by Justice Story
as understood in the analysis of Hilton. Under Huber's theory, the
validity of a contract would depend upon the place where it was
made and if accepted there, then it would be accepted every-
where."' This contract interpretation was followed by an example
of a marriage contract, that if valid where the marriage was per-
formed, then valid everywhere." 2 Huber further comments on the
acceptance of foreign marriages through comity by stating that
the marriage would only be rejected if it were too "revolting" an
example and that this should rarely be the case. 13
Justice Story's theory allows for a bit more discretion than
Huber's and the effect of this discretion can be seen in the seminal
decision of Hilton."4 The court was presented with a petition to
enforce a French judgment where the plaintiffs, French citizens,
were awarded damages for money owed to them through their
business with the defendants, U.S. citizens, who operated a store
in Paris.1 The French citizens could not collect on their judgment
in France because subsequent to the litigation, the defendants
removed all of their property from France and therefore the judg-
ment could not be satisfied.1 6 The defendants alleged that the
trial had been unfair and that in reality the plaintiffs had owed
them large sums of money." 7 The defendants claimed that they
110. Id. at 4. While the first two axioms were rooted in Roman law, the third was
Huber's own creation. Despite this fact, Huber stated that this is the general rule of
law as accepted by everyone pursuant to the principle of ius gentium, which is the law
established by reason among all men and observed equally among all nations. Id. at 3,
7.
111. Id. at 9.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 12.
114. Justice Story established that no nation is bound to recognize a contract that
is injurious to their own interests or those of their citizens. Id. at 23.
115. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 114 (1895).
116. Id. at 116.
117. Id.
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had not been allowed to make a statement, to cross-examine any
witnesses, and further that they had not been allowed to examine
any documents presented by the plaintiffs in the French trial.118
After an extensive analysis in which the court set forth the
doctrine of comity and listed case after case where this doctrine
had been accepted in foreign courts, the court declined to extend
comity to the situation. Instead, the court held that it should be
subjected to re-examination because the French courts would do
the same had the situation been reversed, since a member of their
country had not been treated fairly in the foreign jurisdiction.119
The court emphasized that the defendants did not have the oppor-
tunity to be heard in the French court and also were not afforded
the right to cross-examine witnesses proffered by the plaintiffs.12 °
Since the court was unsure that the result was fair to the U.S.
citizens due to the lack of due process, it felt the case had to be re-
litigated in order to make sure the result was just.
The tenets provided by Justice Story are continually recited
in cases today and still demonstrate the essential spirit of comity.
In MacKenzie v. Barthol, a wife brought an ejectment action
against her former husband in Washington and asked the court to
enforce the judgment procured in British Columbia. The court, in
applying the principles of comity recited by Justice Story, found
that the decision reached in Canada was fair and that the order
should applied on the basis of comity. This case, which was
decided in 2007, is a good example of how comity is used to arrive
at judgments and to affirm statuses across borders, especially the
borders of the U.S. and Canada.
IV. CoMiTy's ROLE IN PERPETUATING
INSTITUTIONAL HOMOPHOBIA
Canada and the U.S. have a history of reciprocity concerning
the recognition of legally performed marriages.1 21 This has led
activists in Canada to argue that same-sex marriages should not
be treated any differently. 22 However, this has not been the case,
as shown by a review of the overwhelming case law which has
118. Id. at 159.
119. Id. at 168.
120. Id. at 159.
121. Deborah Gutierrez, Gay Marriage in Canada: Strategies of the Gay Liberation
Movement and the Implications It Will Have on the United States, 10 NEw ENG. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 175, 208 (2004).
122. Id.
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held these marriages to be against the public policy of states
where DOMA has been enacted.
Whenever comity has been used in order to compel a court to
recognize a foreign same-sex marriage, the doctrine has been
applied in an unexpected way where a state follows DOMA. 123 This
expectation only arises because of the basic tenets of comity and
the fairly consistent way it is applied to cases unrelated to same-
sex marriage. Where a state follows DOMA the state uses the
statute and the discretion allowed for in the principle of comity to
perpetuate this widespread institutional homophobia. A bank-
ruptcy court, in deciding whether a joint petition was correctly
filed by a same-sex couple married in Canada, chose to give comity
no effect because the Canadian policy directly conflicted with that
of the state, and therefore the Court had to prefer its own laws to
that of a foreign nation."' Similarly, a New Jersey tax court also
denied recognition of a Canadian marriage because the laws of
Canada were inconsistent with those of New Jersey, which did not
recognize same-sex marriages. 2 ,
In both of these cases, the doctrine of comity was used as a
last ditch effort to have a foreign performed same-sex marriage
recognized in the U.S. After due process, equal protection, Fifth
Amendment, Ninth Amendment, and Tenth Amendment argu-
ments are made, comity is the catchall that petitioners use in
order to salvage their case."' As in these two cases, this doctrine
has been of no use in allowing for the recognition of foreign per-
formed same-sex marriages because of the pervasive nature of
institutional homophobia.
Homophobic beliefs are "rooted in and perpetuate cruel ste-
reotypes, which surface in all facets of the law" through institu-
tional homophobia. 121 Institutional homophobia occurs when
major social institutions, laws, customs, religious orders, schools
and other organizational codes work together to reinforce existing
prejudice and discrimination. 12 There are numerous examples of
institutional homophobia that are present in daily life such as
housing discrimination, statutes that make same-sex activity ille-
gal and punishable by law, denial of child custody, invalidation of
123. See In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (W.D. Wash. 2004)
124. Id. at 133-34.
125. Hennefeld v. Montclair, 22 N.J.Tax 166, 184 (2005).
126. See Kandu, 315 B.R. at 123.
127. RONNER, supra note 21, at 3.
128. CHUCK STEWART, CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES: HoMosExuALImTY AND THE LAW
145 (ABC-CLIO, Inc. 2001).
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personal unions, exclusion from job protections, denial of immi-
gration, discrimination in public accommodations, and even disin-
heritance. 129 According to a survey by the National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force, more than ninety percent of respondents had
experienced some form of victimization based on sexual identity.
130
The fostering of institutional homophobia through laws and codes
reinforces and validates peoples' feelings about their own personal
homophobia.
The federal government is fairly obvious when trying to enact
laws based on homophobia.13 1 When Congress passed the Hate
Crimes Statistics Act of 1990 in an effort to collect data on crimes
based on race, religion, sexual orientation, and ethnicity, a Sena-
tor proposed an amendment that expressed the following:
1.) the homosexual movement threatens the strength and the
survival of the American family as the basic unit of
society;
2.) state sodomy laws should be enforced because they are in
the best interest of public health;
3.) the federal government should not provide discrimination
protections on the basis of sexual orientation; and
4.) school curriculums should not condone homosexuality as
an acceptable lifestyle in American society.
132
This Amendment was not adopted, but instead more heterocentric
language was used to express this homophobia:
1.) the American family life is the foundation of American
Society;
2.) federal policy should encourage the well being, financial
security, and health of the American family; and
3.) schools should not de-emphasize the critical value of
American family life.13
While this language is more subtle, the amendment did go on to
state that nothing in the Act should be construed to promote or
encourage homosexuality. Institutional homophobia is seen at its
worst in statutes such as the Hate Crimes Statistics Act. Due to
the statutes and codes that basically permit discrimination
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Robert B. Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The
Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 150 (1992).
132. 136 CONG. REC. S1169 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1990).
133. Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, § 2(a), 104 Stat. 140
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 534).
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against homosexuals, it is no wonder that this discrimination has
pervaded common law applications as well. Comity is applied by
judges who, by definition of the doctrine, have discretion in their
application of the standard. By combining the doctrine of comity
with DOMA, we have an explanation of how institutional
homophobia is producing this weird, but consistent result, which
favors rejecting same-sex marriages. These standards taken
together make sexual orientation the last legal form of discrimina-
tion in the U.S.'34
DOMA is the perfect example of a law giving special rights to
heterosexuals and depriving homosexuals of those same rights. At
least 1,049 federal regulations involve marital status, and thus
DOMA influences these regulations and places same-sex couples
in the place of second-class citizens.'35 Institutional homophobia is
very present in the framework of American society and this is fur-
ther evidenced by the effect of comity when used to recognize
same-sex marriage.
V. CoMiTY: A WEIRD, BUT CONSISTENT RESULT
Comity, as described in Hilton and as adopted by the Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, should be more effective
as a doctrine than the same-sex marriage cases have suggested in
that the public policy exception should not be used as a shield to
prevent migrating marriages from recognition. The Restatement
posits that a judgment confirming the status of a person that is
conclusive between the parties is entitled to recognition in the
U.S.'36 unless it is repugnant to the public policy of the U.S. 137 The
Restatement goes on to provide for divorce decrees, 3 ' child cus-
tody, 3 9 and support orders, 4 ° yet has no provision for recognition
of foreign marriages. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws takes a similar approach to recognition of status, but its pro-
134. Henry F. Fradella, Integrating the Study of Sexuality into the Core Law School
Curriculum: Suggestions for Substantive Criminal Law Courses, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC.
60, 61 (2007).
135. STEWART, supra note 128, at 146. Stewart also explores the legal challenges
that are continually being mounted to remove discriminatory laws that keep
homosexuals as second-class citizens in the preface of this work.
136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 (1987).
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 (1987).
138. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 484 (1987).
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 485 (1987).
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 486 (1987).
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visions concerning the validity of a marriage in a state are as
follows:
A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state
where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be rec-
ognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of
another state which had the most significant relationship
to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the
marriage.'
This provision is similar to the Restatement of Foreign Relations
but is more specific to marriage. The major difference between the
two is that the Foreign Relations Restatement requires that the
status be repugnant to the public policy, whereas the Conflict of
Laws Restatement requires both that the state possess a strong
public policy against the marriage and have a significant relation
at the time of marriage.
The very fact that thirty-nine states have felt strongly enough
to enact some version of DOMA amounts to a strong public policy
allowing states to refuse the recognition of legally performed for-
eign marriages. When marriages migrate, the parties involved
may not realize the ramifications of these actions, such as the loss
of all their spousal rights. As in the example where a Canadian
couple traveled for vacation to the United States and ended up in
the hospital in a state that does not recognize their marriage, hos-
pital policy could interfere and keep the couple apart, which would
result in a loss of recognition of the couple's status that was not
accounted for in their vacation plans.142 This should not be the
case. The doctrine of comity should be followed to allow recogni-
tion of these marriages instead of further fostering institutional
homophobia.
Critics have called modern discussions of comity "irrelevant
at best, or cruelly ironic at worst.""' U.S. courts have gone so far
to disregard comity and reject foreign decrees that it "stands
accused of acting with unprecedented unilateralism in the inter-
national sphere; or dramatically exceeding its legitimate judicial
and legislative jurisdiction; even of casually disregarding its
treaty obligations."'4 Comity, if it is to play any role in interna-
tional law, must be elevated in status in order to provide synchro-
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971).
142. See Rothaus, supra note 95.
143. C. Ryan Reetz, Prologue to PEDRO J. MARTINEz-FRAGA, THE NEW ROLE OF
COMITY IN PRIVATE PROCEDURAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (Thomson Aranzadi 2007).
144. Id.
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nization in the international community of nations.'
In Justice Brennan's dissent in the case of First National City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,'46 the dissenters established a
new framework for analyzing foreign decrees and giving them
effect in the U.S. First, the extent to which U.S. interests were to
be affected was evaluated. Then the court was to look at the inter-
est germane to the foreign sovereign at issue. Last, the court
would find the "extent to which a specific holding would harmo-
nize with the interests of the community of nations in developing,
promoting, and preserving a reliable efficacious system of interna-
tional law."'47 This system would still allow for judicial discretion
and would recognize the issues surrounding the current frame-
work and discriminatory holdings of courts across the nation.
Courts consistently speak of comity as if it is an obligation,
yet hold otherwise when their decisions are rendered by denying
recognition to a foreign marriage. Comity is meant to foster mutu-
ality and form a moral necessity to do justice, in order that it may
be done in return for the U.S. 4 " One court has even gone so far as
to say that comity should not just be used when it is within the
interests of the domestic party to use it, but should be a "principle
under which judicial decisions reflect the systemic value of recip-
rocal tolerance and goodwill."'49 Also, that choice of law should be
governed by the needs of other countries within the larger inter-
national community.1 5° This talk of reciprocity and systematic
approaches is far from what courts do when confronted with
issues where comity is most commonly used. Furthermore, as seen
by comity's application to same-sex marriages, comity should
never be used in a way that is inconsistent with its definition in
order to distinguish minorities.
Marriage, before the rest of the world had considered the
legalization of same-sex marriages, was a common example of how
comity was used.' 51 Choice of law articles and books were replete
with examples of what happened when marriages migrated and
145. PEDRO J. MARTINEZ-FRAGA, THE NEW ROLE OF COMITY IN PRIVATE PROCEDURAL
INTERNATIONAL LAw 91 (Thomson Aranzadi 2007).
146. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 787 (1972).
147. MARTINEZ-FRAGA, supra note 145, at 117-18.
148. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.D. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
149. Id. at 555.
150. Id. at 555-56.
151. See generally WATSON, supra note 16.
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were against the public policy of their new domicile. 5 2 However, in
most cases, marriages were accepted as long as they were recog-
nized in the place performed. Public policy issues arose when
something was truly repugnant to public policy, such as incestu-
ous marriages where the degree of relation between the parties
was close, 53 as in the marriage between a brother and sister, or
polygamous marriages.1 54 This is not the case anymore.
Most courts, when rejecting the recognition of same-sex mar-
riage, cite history, if they are going to give a reason at all. For
example, in New Jersey, the court stated that the state marriage
statute was understood to reject same-sex marriages because his-
torically marriages were always between members of the opposite
sex. 155 No specific state law stated this, but by reference to its
incest statutes, which indicate that a man is not to marry any of
his ancestors' daughters and sisters, the court found there is a
strong indication that marriage was only seen to occur between
members of different genders. 56 While this reference does show
the traditional outlook, it ignores any reference to "strong" public
policy.
The traditional notions of marriage that proponents seek to
protect come from historical notions of gender that have been
abolished in our current society. 7 Gender restrictions in marriage
arose when genders were legally required to adhere to specific
roles .' These legally mandated gender roles have been abolished
by law and currently there are no gender specific roles that a man
and woman play in a marriage. By citing tradition in an analysis
for denying same-sex marriage, the government seeks to give
credit to antiquated gender notions that are no longer feasible and
downright discriminatory in today's society. The only explanation
to adhering to tradition would simply be to state that opposite-sex
152. Id. at 9. "'Everyone is considered to have contracted in that place which he is
bound to perform.' Hence, for marriage, for instance, the place of marriage contract is
not where the marriage contract was entered into, but where the parties intend to
conduct the marriage, which will be the normal residence of the parties."
153. See P.H. Vartanian, Annotation, Recognition of Foreign Marriage as Affected
by Policy in Respect of Incestuous Marriages, 117 A.L.R. 186 (1938). Usually,
marriages between an uncle and a niece were accepted where marriages between a
brother and sister would be more questionable.
154. Bronson v. Swensen, No. 2:04CV21TS, 2005 WL 1310482, at *1, *2 (D. Utah
2005).
155. Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114, at * 1, *23 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 2003).
156. Id. at *3.
157. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
158. Id. at 998.
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couples are better than same-sex couples." 9 "The state cannot
have an interest in disadvantaging an unpopular minority group
simply because the group is unpopular. 1 60
Arguments about the history of marriage are in themselves
circular. As noted by the California Supreme Court, when the
court was considering six cases questioning the decision to deny
same-sex couples the right to marriage, "history alone is not inva-
riably an appropriate guide for determining the meaning and
scope of this fundamental constitutional guarantee."16' The court
based this opinion on the fact that prohibiting interracial mar-
riages was found to be inconsistent with the right to marry, even
though those statutes had existed "since the founding of the
state."162 The California Supreme Court recognized, in similar rea-
soning to the Canadian Charter, that marriage as an institution
has evolved from traditional notions which are hundreds of years
old. Therefore, the court revisited the substantive rights embodied
in the fundamental right to marry and established that this right
should be extended to couples of the same-sex. 63
The California Supreme Court found that the substantive
right to marry was embodied by the rights of an individual and
not those of a couple. It is "the opportunity of an individual to
establish - with the person whom the individual has chosen to
share his or her life - an officially recognized and protected family
possessing mutual rights and responsibilities and entitled to the
same respect and dignity accorded a union traditionally desig-
nated as marriage." 164 The court further found that it is against
the right of equal protection to deny same-sex couples the right to
marry and instead provide civil unions.' 65 This would serve to den-
igrate them as "second-class citizens."166
Same-sex marriages have also been criticized because they
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
161. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 399 (Cal. 2008). Even though this case has
been superseded by a state Constitutional Amendment in 2008 which provides "only
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California," this case
still establishes the relevant arguments for why same-sex marriages should be
recognized in the United States. However, this amendment was declared
unconstitutional in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992 (N.D. Cal.
2010).
162. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 399.
163. Id. at 433-34.
164. Id. at 399.
165. Id. at 434-35.
166. Id. at 402.
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would not lead to procreation, which is simply not the case any-
more. With the wide spread use of in-vitro fertilization and sperm
donors, same-sex couples are now able to care for children in the
same way that heterosexual families are. Furthermore, heterosex-
ual couples who have no intention of ever procreating are allowed
to marry; therefore to disallow homosexual marriages on that
basis alone is discrimination.
Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that same-sex
parents and opposite-sex parents are of a different quality when it
comes to parenting. One court found that there was explicit evi-
dence to the contrary. The Northern District of California declared
a state constitutional amendment that banned same-sex marriage
as unconstitutional based on rational basis review.'67 The court
found that same-sex parents and opposite-sex parents are of equal
quality and that the amendment banning gay marriage "does not
make it more likely that opposite-sex couples will marry and raise
offspring biologically related to both parents."168 By not allowing
gay marriage, states also promote sexual activity, child-bearing,
and child-rearing to occur outside of marriage and create unstable
families. 69 Therefore, the reasoning advanced in support of the
amendment, which is similar to the reasoning advanced in sup-
port of DOMA, had no rational basis to support upholding the
amendment.
Congress wanted to protect traditional marriages because the
addition of same-sex couples would lead to more divorces. 7 ° As
stated in the legislative history, they wanted to avoid "opening a
new front in the war."17' It is true that if same-sex couples marry,
they may want to divorce. Currently, cases exist where homosex-
ual couples seek to have a court divide their property in a divorce-
like action when their relationship has ended. 72 In this case, it
would be more prudent to provide these couples with the mecha-
nism of dividing property that heterosexual couples are afforded
in order to avoid frivolous litigation in contract actions, which
would be burdened with implied contract claims. 173 Also, it would
be unfair to same-sex couples to keep them from those forums to
167. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
168. Id. at 999-1000.
169. Id. at 1000.
170. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 11, 14 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2905, 2918.
171. Id. at 15.
172. In re Goodale, 298 B.R. 886 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
173. Id.
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which heterosexual couples have access, because it could lead to
injustice against one partner or their children. The governmental
interests provided may be "rational" according to most courts, but
they are by no means persuasive when looking at the true effect
that they could have on the U.S. court system.
Courts also have reasoned that same-sex marriages should be
avoided because they would act as a gateway to the recognition of
polygamous and incestuous marriages. This scare tactic is similar
to the one used when arguing against interracial marriages dur-
ing the Civil Rights Movement.14 Several of the arguments as
enumerated here against same-sex marriage parallel those made
when challenging interracial marriage. Furthermore, after inter-
racial couples successfully challenged the ban on their marriage,
there has been neither a "downfall of society nor an abandonment
of marriage" as predicted.175 Just as racism was the source of the
laws against interracial marriage, institutional homophobia is
similarly fueling the arguments presented against same-sex
marriage.
Comity, when applied to same-sex marriage, faces many of
the same barriers that domestic recognition faces. For this reason,
comity will be interpreted as providing a shield against these for-
eign performed marriages just like DOMA in order to further
cement institutional homophobia into our legal system. Even
though the principles of foreign recognition enunciated in Hilton
would seem to lead to a different result, courts are consistently
using comity to deny recognition of same-sex marriages. The use
of comity in this fashion demonstrates how DOMA has made it
acceptable for individual judges to discriminate against homosex-
ual couples. This institutional homophobia stems from the laws
and codes that are in force, but reach out to all common law doc-
trines as well by providing implicit acceptance of this
discrimination.
It would seem that on the federal level, where the government
would be more concerned with foreign relations, it would be
important to foster these relationships by recognizing the status
afforded by other countries. On that level it should be important to
fight for the recognition of foreign performed marriages over those
of the states. As long as the states individually allow for this insti-
tutional homophobia to permeate their political system, comity
174. STEWART, supra note 128, at 181.
175. Id.
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will deny recognition of same-sex marriages even though it is con-
trary to the policy established by Justice Story in Hilton.
VI. CONCLUSION
Canada has made major progress in its recognition of the
rights of the gay and lesbian movement, especially through its
legalization of same-sex marriage. The U.S. has made slow pro-
gress towards this recognition as well, but enough states have
enacted DOMA to create divergent interests between these bor-
dering countries.
While there has typically been recognition between the U.S.
and Canada of marriages performed legally in each place, this pol-
icy has not been continued and instead couples are relegated to
second-class citizenship because of institutional homophobia. As
one California federal court noted:
Many people erroneously believe that the sexual experience
of lesbians and gay men represents the gratification of
purely prurient interests, not the expression of mutual
affection and love. They fail to recognize that gay people
seek and engage in stable monogamous relationships.
Instead, to many, the very existence of gay men is inimical
to the family.'76
Even though this stereotype should be counteracted and dimin-
ished when people see that homosexuals are seeking to make their
union official in the eyes of the law, this is not the case. Homosex-
uals are seeking monogamous, stable relationships through the
institution of marriage as any couple looking to solidify their rela-
tionship would. This stereotype has not diminished and instead
has only been reaffirmed by numerous court opinions that seek to
keep same-sex couples away from the institution of marriage. It
seems almost as if this stereotype and the fight for same-sex mar-
riage have been reconciled, and the stereotype has evolved to new
levels, which result in people believing that if same-sex couples
were allowed to marry, the marriage would be unstable since they
only seek the gratification of purely prurient interests.
While many critics believe that same-sex marriage is the final
barrier in the demise of institutional homophobia,"7 this barrier is
only part of the solution. Since so many states have enacted their
176. RONNER, supra note 21, at 5 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 14 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2919).
177. Id. at 29.
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own mini-DOMA and continue to find it perfectly constitutional,
there is no possibility of recognition principles such as comity
breaking the barriers to achieve the result desired by the homo-
sexual community. Comity will not prevail until institutional
homophobia recedes through the repeal of statutes that implicitly
allow for this overt discrimination. Therefore, comity will continue
to be twisted and abused, but consistently applied as long as
Americans continue to view same-sex marriage as inferior to het-
erosexual marriages.
The principle of comity as described in Hilton demanded more
in order to prevent the chaos of each country's arbitrary dismissal
of another country's law. The court in Hilton cited to a case sur-
rounding the status of a marriage to demonstrate this point.7 ' The
court directly quoted a case that came to fruition prior to the exis-
tence of the United States as a country to show the effect that
comity should have in regulating status and foreign judgments:
It is against the law of nations not to give credit to the judg-
ments and sentences of foreign countries till they be
reversed by the law, and according to the form, of those
countries wherein they were given; for what right hath one
kingdom to reverse the judgment of another? And how can
we refuse to let a sentence take place till it be reversed?
And what confusion would follow in Christendom, if they
should serve us so abroad, and give no credit to our
sentences! 7 9
This "confusion" is precisely what the justices in the Supreme
Court were trying to avoid when introducing comity to American
jurisprudence.
In order to achieve a cohesive community of nations, the origi-
nal common law standards that governed marriage should be fol-
lowed. This means applying comity to foreign performed same-sex
marriages that will allow for recognition when couples immigrate.
This change will be more likely to come about when institutional
homophobia has ebbed, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
used in recognizing same-sex marriages. This change could be
forced on the U.S. sooner if the Respect for Marriage Act is passed.
The Respect for Marriage Act would serve to repeal DOMA and
adds:
(a) For the purposes of any Federal law in which marital
status is a factor, an individual shall be considered married
178. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 145 (1895).
179. Id.
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if that individual's marriage is valid in the State where the
marriage was entered into or, in the case of a marriage
entered into outside any State, if the marriage is valid in
the place where entered into and the marriage could have
been entered into in a State.8 °
Marriages that are valid where celebrated should be valid every-
where, as they were before same-sex marriage became an issue.
Even though any discussion about comity has been described
as "irrelevant at best," 8 ' other scholars urge that there is more to
the comity discussion than courts give it credit.'82 Comity should
be elevated to a status that recognizes foreign law and promotes
the community of nations that is forming with the world's interna-
tional economy."'
180. Respect for Marriage Act of 2009, H.R. 3567, 111th Cong. § 7(a) (2009).
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